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I.  Introduction 
The greatest transfer of ownership in the history of the corporation, privatization, began in the 
1980s in the United Kingdom, spread out during the 1990s, and continues apace, despite negative 
market conditions. Governments all over the world have either sold or are selling large chunks of 
their ownership in corporations to the private sector. There is a lingering belief, however, that this 
privatization is being carried out reluctantly. There are only few stories in the popular press that 
document governments privatizing with enthusiasm; most of the news stories depict governments 
that are faced with stiff opposition from many vested interests, but are forced to privatize because of 
budgetary shortfalls and/or external pressure from international organizations and lending agencies.  
We define reluctant privatization as the transfer of ownership rights without a transfer of 
control rights in state-owned enterprises (SOEs). Italy represents an interesting example of this 
reluctance to completely separate firms from the government. Privatization did not become a 
political issue until the beginning of the 1990s, at a time when the country was facing one of the 
most acute economic and political crises of the post-war period. The inefficiency of the SOE sector   
is one of the main causes of weakness of the economy After the April 1992 general elections, the 
government led by PM Giuliano Amato, heading a wide center-left coalition, decided to launch the 
first large-scale privatization process. The 70 major privatization deals implemented from 1993 to 
date raised more than $100 billion in revenues, placing Italy third in the global ranking of the 
magnitude of privatization (Securities Data Corporation). Despite these remarkable quantitative 
results, the Italian government is still an influential shareholder in several privatized firms.
1 The 
Italian case, and many others which could be chosen from developed and developing countries, 
                                                 
1 For example, it holds direct and indirect stakes (through Cassa Depositi e Prestiti SpA) in ENI, ENEL, Alitalia, the 
flagship carrier, Finmeccanica, the aerospace, defence and IT group, and Poste Italiane. It also enjoys special powers to 
veto strategic decisions and acquisitions in fully privatized companies such as Telecom Italia, the former 
telecommunication state monopoly.  2
suggests that privatizations do not always involve a dramatic change in the ownership structure of 
SOEs, and that governments hang on to control by direct or indirect means.  
The purpose of this paper is twofold.  First, we want to document whether there does exist 
such a reluctance to relinquish control.  Second, if we do find such a reluctance, we would like to 
estimate its effect on firm value. 
Reluctant privatization is not only important from a practical standpoint, but it is also of 
theoretical interest due to the insights it may offer to the debate on the comparative performance of 
private versus state-owned firms. The proponents of the so-called political view argue that a 
principal-agent problem plagues SOEs, in that the owners (i.e. the taxpayers) have different 
incentives from the manager (i.e. the bureaucrat or the politician controlling the firm). In SOEs, the 
manager may run the company to achieve political objectives (such as excess employment) and 
forgo maximizing profits. Full privatization transfers ownership and control rights to outside 
investors, whose main concern is the maximization of the value of their holdings, so that greater 
emphasis is placed on efficiency (Shleifer and Vishny, 1994). The empirical implication of this 
theory is that fully privatized companies should be more valuable than privatized companies in 
which governments still enjoy control rights. In other words, government reluctance to privatize 
should be negatively discounted in market values. 
The government may be a bad owner of corporations. However, private ownership also comes 
with costs. Since Berle and Means (1932) seminal work, it is known that diffuse ownership in the 
absence of suitable governance mechanisms, both internal and external, exposes minority 
shareholders to the risk of expropriation by managers. Large shareholders may reduce the agency 
costs of managerial control (Jensen and Meckling, 1976, Shleifer and Vishny, 1986), but ownership 
concentration has also been associated with the extraction of private benefits by controlling 
shareholders at the expense of outside investors (Claessens et al., 2002; Johnson et al., 2000; La 
Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes and Shleifer, 2002). Finally, the government may also provide special 
benefits to privatized firms. It can shield privatized companies from competition, afford them a  3
favorable regulatory environment, subsidize loans, and guarantee contracts. These benefits may 
outweigh the cost of political interference. Documenting whether large shareholdings by the state 
destroy or create value is an empirical issue that can be investigated by analyzing the relation 
between the market value of a privatized firm and the size of government’s residual stake.  
We explore the issue of privatization and corporate control by carrying out a comprehensive 
analysis of the evolution of voting rights in a sample of 141 privatized companies from developed 
economies, over the period 1996 to 2000, that we match against a control sample of private firms. 
We find that the most common outcome is for the state to be the largest ultimate owner, both as of 
the end of 1996, when 34.75 percent of privatized firms have the state as largest ultimate owner, 
and as of the end of 2000, when the government is still the largest owner in 29.79 percent of cases. 
We observe some convergence in the concentration of voting power between privatized and 
matching firms. This convergence, however, is largely due to changes in the control structure of 
matching firms, which become much more concentrated as a consequence of merger and 
acquisition activity. 
We additionally find that, as of the end of 1996, 62.5% of privatized firms have outstanding 
“golden shares”.
2 Golden shares are particularly common amongst companies in which the 
government is not the largest shareholder. This combined evidence allows us to conclude that, 
through ownership or golden shares, governments control 65.5 percent of privatized firms as of the 
end of 1996, and 62.4 percent of privatized firms as of the end of 2000. Thus, in the majority of 
cases, the “privatization” process did not entail a complete relinquishment of power by the state. 
This first part of the analysis allows us to document the existence of governments’ reluctance 
to privatize. This fact implies a second question: does government reluctance matter? Do large 
holdings by the state affect negatively the market value of privatized companies? 
                                                 
2 We define golden share as the complex of special powers granted to the state and the statutory constraints in 
privatized companies (see Section III.B).    4
To answer this question, we first compare the market-to-book ratio of privatized companies 
with that of a matching sample. We document a convergence in company market-to-book ratios 
through time. However, we find that this convergence is not the consequence of government 
relinquishment of control rights. Interestingly, a panel data analysis reveals that a larger percentage 
of voting rights held by the state does not negatively affect performance. Second, we compare the 
(adjusted) stock returns of privatized firms, and again find no evidence of systematic 
underperformance of privatized companies with larger government’s stakes. The same results hold 
when we control for endogeneity of government’s voting rights. 
Our paper is related to several studies in the privatization and corporate governance literature. 
In a recent study, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes and Shleifer (2002) conclude that government 
ownership of banks is still “large and pervasive” across countries [p. 265]. This result is confirmed 
in other recent studies on the ultimate ownership of listed corporations around the world. For 
example, La Porta et al. (1999) show that, across 27 countries, the government ultimately controls 
at least 10 percent of voting rights in 20.19% of large size and 16.19% of medium size (mostly non-
financial) corporations. Claessens et al. (2000) and Faccio and Lang (2002) confirm that 
governments are particularly common as ultimate owners in Austria, Finland, Indonesia, Italy and 
Malaysia, Norway, and Singapore. Additionally, Faccio and Lang (2002) report that pyramids and 
holdings through multiple control chains are used to enhance control in 35.32% and 11.01% of 
state-controlled firms, respectively. These latter figures clearly indicate that measures of voting 
power based on government direct ownership are inadequate as they substantially understate voting 
power. 
Although these studies properly employ some measure of ultimate ownership to identify 
controlling shareholders, they are not undertaken with the purpose of analyzing and tracking 
changes in the control structure of privatized firms. On the other hand, other studies on privatization  5
have focused on event dates and direct ownership.
3 In a recent paper Boubakri, Cosset and 
Guedhami (2004) look at direct ownership and conclude “that government relinquishes control over 
time.” We show that the picture looks totally different when indirect voting rights and special 
powers are properly accounted for. Our study makes an original contribution in employing the 
relatively new concept of ultimate control to follow changes in the ownership of privatized 
companies and their effects on firm value.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In section II, we describe the sample and data 
employed in the study. In section III, we discuss the ultimate control structure of privatized and 
matching firms, as well as the diffusion of golden shares. Section IV addresses the issue of the 
convergence in the value and performance of privatized and matching firms, and section V 
concludes the paper. 
 
II.  Data 
A. Privatized companies and control sample 
The complete list of privatization transactions in public equity markets in OECD economies 
before 1/1/1997 is obtained from the Global New Issues Database of Securities Data Corporation 
(SDC). This source provides us with a list of 205 privatized companies. We cross check the 
presence of these companies both in the Privatization International (PI) Database and in 
Megginson’s Appendix.
4 All the companies in our list are also reported in the PI dataset and appear 
in Megginson’s Appendix. We then compare the data obtained from SDC with the information 
from selected official sources, such as the Italian Ministry of the Economy and Finance, the British 
                                                 
3 A number of studies (e.g., Megginson, Nash and Van Randenborgh, 1994, Boubakri and Cosset, 1998, D’Souza and 
Megginson, 1999) document that, on average, privatized firms increase their profitability and/or efficiency around the 
privatization date (see Megginson and Netter, 2001, for an excellent review). In a different type of study, Dewenter and 
Malatesta (2001) report that, although privatized firms increase their accounting profitability prior to the privatization 
(which suggests that it is not the privatization per se to determine an increase in firm profitability), state-owned firms 
are less profitable than privately owned companies on an accounting basis.  On the other hand, they report that on 
average, over a five-year period after the privatization, privatized firms have outperformed their markets by 88 percent 
based on a market-adjusted stock return basis.  6
HM Treasury, and Spanish SEPI, and other privatization agencies. On average, SDC covers 98 per 
cent of privatized companies in these countries, which allows us to conclude that the SDC 
privatization database provides a representative sample of share issue privatization in OECD 
economies. 
For each privatized firm, we identify a matching company as follows. We first match 
companies by country, and then by industry (following Campbell’s (1996) classification). Potential 
matches are identified from the firms included in Worldscope. In general, we choose as match the 
private firm with the market capitalization closest to our privatized firm that is within a range of +/-
30%. If we do not find a match in the country, we first match by industry, and then pick up an 
international firm in the same sector with the market capitalization closest to our privatized firm, in 
the +/-30% range. If we do not find a match in the same industry as the privatized company, we 
first match by country. We then pick the domestic firm with the market capitalization closest to our 
privatized firm, in the +/-30% range (as of the end of 1996). Whenever the government shows up as 
shareholder for a matching firm, we replace it with the next size match.  
After the matching procedure described above, and after requiring that ownership data be 
available, we end up with a final sample of 141 firms privatized in 1996 or earlier, and 141 
matching companies. The majority of the firms in the control group (68 per cent) are matched with 
the first best case, 30 per cent with the second best case, and only one with the third best case.
5  
For all companies included in the study, financial data for the period 1996-2000 is obtained 
from Worldscope. Name changes and acquisitions are tracked using the information contained in 
Worldscope, Extel, and SDC. In the case of mergers and acquisitions, we track the ownership of the 
bidder or the company resulting from the merger. If two privatized or matching firms merge 
together we continue to keep two separate observations in the sample. 
 
                                                                                                                                                                  
4 http://faculty-staff.ou.edu/M/William.L.Megginson-1/  7
B. Control structures: Data and examples 
We employ the sources listed in Appendix A to measure the ultimate control (voting) rights of 
the largest shareholders for all privatized and matching companies, as of the end 1996 and 2000. 
Corporate control is measured in terms of voting rights, following the procedure employed in 
previous studies by La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer (1999), Claessens, Djankov, and Lang 
(2000), and Faccio and Lang (2002). For example, if a family owns 50% of Firm X, which owns 
30% of Firm Y, then we posit that this family controls 30% of Firm Y (the percent is determined by 
the weakest link along the control chain). As discussed in detail later, ultimate control is defined at 
the 10% cut-off level, i.e. we posit that a company has a large shareholder whenever anyone 
directly or indirectly controls at least 10% of voting rights. In addition, for the  privatized 
companies, full information on ownership restrictions, voting caps, and special powers granted to 
the state are collected from the privatization prospectuses.  
Two examples show that privatized companies may have quite complex control structures.  
The following privatized firms are selected: Deutsche Lufthansa AG (Germany), and SGS-
Thomson Microelectronics (now STMicroelectronics, France). 
[Figure 1 goes here] 
Figure 1 depicts the control structure of Lufthansa, Germany's largest airline, as of end 1996. 
The company has five direct shareholders: Deutsche Postbank, Deutsche Bahn, KfW, the State of 
North Rhine-Westphalia and MGL. Deutsche Postbank, Deutsche Bahn, KfW are government-
majority controlled firms. The State of North Rhine-Westphalia is a local government authority. 
MGL is a publicly traded company with two main shareholders: Bayerische Landesbank 
Girozentrale (with a 44.5% control stake) and Dresdner Bank (also with a 44.5% control stake). 
Bayerische Landesbank, in turn, is 50% controlled by the State of Bavaria (a local government 
                                                                                                                                                                  
5 Whenever the government shows up as largest shareholder of a matching firm, a new matching company with only 
private shareholders is selected following the procedure just described.  8
authority) and 50% controlled by the Association of Bavarian Saving Banks. Dresdner Bank is 
100% controlled by Allianz (which is part of a complex cross-holding).  
Lufthansa has three ultimate shareholders with the 10% cutoff rule: Allianz, which indirectly 
controls 10.05% of votes (the minimum among 10.05%, 44.5% and 100%), the Association of 
Bavarian Saving Banks, which controls 10.05% of votes (the minimum between 10.05%, 44.5% 
and 50%), and the German government, which controls 50.70%
6 of the votes. The  state is thus 
Lufthansa’s (largest) controlling shareholder. Notice that we would have ended up with a 
Government stake of only 1.77% had we focused on direct ownership. 
 [Figure 2 goes here] 
Figure 2 illustrates the control structure of SGS-Thomson Microelectronics as of mid-1996. 
STmicroelectronics N.V. (formerly known as SGS-Thomson Microelectronics N.V.) manufactures 
and supplies a broad range of semi-conductor integrated circuits and discrete devices. The 
company’s control structure involves complex pyramids. The bottom left side of the figure depicts 
the stakes that can be traced back to the French government. The right side reports the chains that 
trace back to the Italian government. The French government indirectly controls SGS through three 
(100%) government controlled firms: SOGEPA, CEA and France Telecom. CEA (through CEA 
Industries) and France Telecom fully control FT1CI, which has a 50.1% stake in FT2CI. So, they 
indirectly control 50.1% of FT2CI (min(100%, 50.1%)). SOGEPA indirectly controls the remaining 
49.9% (min(49.9%, 58%, 100%)) of FT2CI. Thus, overall, the French government controls 100% 
of FT2CI (50.1%+49.9%). In turn, FT2CI indirectly controls 50% (min(69.4%,100%, 50%)) of 
SGS-Thomson Microelectronics. Thus we posit that the French government controls 50% of SGS 
(min(50%,100%)). 
The Italian government, on the other hand, indirectly controls SGS through IRI and Comitato 
SIP (two firms that it wholly owns). IRI has a 50.1% stake in MEI, while Comitato SIR holds the 
                                                 
6 [1.03% (min (100%, 1.03%)) + 0.4% (min (100%, 0.4%)) +37.45% (min (100%, 37.45%))+1.77%+10.05% (min 
(10.05%, 44.5%, 50%))]  9
remaining 49.9%. Thus, through these two companies, the Italian government controls 100% of 
MEI’s votes. MEI, in turn, has a 50% stake in SGS-Thomson Microelectronics Holding NV, who 
controls 100% of SGS-Thomson Microelectronics Holding BV which, in turn, has a 69.4% stake in 
SGS-Thomson Microelectronics NV. Thus, through this pyramid, the Italian government also 
controls 50% of SGS-Thomson Microelectronics NV’s voting capital (min(69.4%, 100%, 50%, 
100%)). This company is therefore under full government control, albeit two different nations are 
involved.  
 
III.        The ultimate control structure of privatized and matching firms 
A.  Evolution of control structures 
Following previous research, we classify ultimate owners into the following six types: 
- State: A national government, a local authority (county, municipality, etc.), or a government 
agency; 
- Family:  A family or a firm that is unlisted on any stock exchange; 
- Widely held corporation: A non-financial firm, defined as widely held (that is, no shareholder 
controls 10% or more of the votes);   
- Widely held financial institution: A financial firm (SIC 6000-6999) that is widely held;  
- Miscellaneous:  Charities, voting trusts, employees, cooperatives, foundations, or minority foreign 
investors; 
- Cross-holdings: Firm X is controlled by another firm, Y, which is in turn controlled by X, or 
directly controls at least 10% of its own stock. 
If the ultimate owner of a corporation is an unlisted firm, we trace back its owners using all 
available data sources. This was not always possible because most of our sample countries do not 
require unlisted firms to disclose their owners. Companies that do not have a shareholder 
controlling at least 10 percent of votes are classified as widely held.  10
[Table I goes here] 
Table I analyzes the ultimate controlling owners of privatized and matching corporations 
under the 10 percent rule. Panel A shows that the state is the most common type of ultimate owner 
for privatized firms. This is true both as of the end of 1996, when 34.75 percent of privatized firms 
have the state as largest ultimate owner, and as of the end of 2000, when the government is the 
largest ultimate owner  in 29.79 percent of cases.
7 Thus, even after privatization, almost one third of 
firms remain government-controlled. A large fraction of privatized companies do not have a 
controlling shareholder under the 10 percent rule, and are therefore labeled as “widely held”. The 
proportion of widely held companies increases through time amongst privatized firms (27.66 
percent in 1996, and 30.50 percent in 2000), although insignificantly so. Amongst privatized firms, 
the second most important type of ultimate owner is families and unlisted companies. Families 
control 16.31 percent of firms in 1996, and 19.86 percent in 2000. Widely held financial institutions 
are also relatively frequent large shareholders, and include 17.02 percent of cases in 1996 and in 
9.93 percent of cases in 2000. Widely held corporations, miscellaneous investors, and cross-
holdings appear to play a substantially more marginal role. 
The ownership of matching firms exhibits a slightly different pattern (see Table I, Panel B). 
By construction, the government never is the largest shareholder in the matching sample. Most of 
these companies are widely held (37.59 percent of cases in 1996 and 41.84 percent in 2000). 
Families are the second most important type of investors, and are the largest shareholder in 35.46 
percent of cases in 1996, and 28.37 percent of cases in 2000. Widely held financial institutions are 
also relatively important, being the largest shareholders for 19.86 percent of all matching firms in 
1996, and for 11.35 percent in 2000. Once again, widely held corporations, miscellaneous investors, 
and cross-holdings play a minor role, although the former two investor types are definitely more 
common amongst matching than amongst privatized firms.  
                                                 
7 Thus, the percentage of firms for which the government is the major shareholder declined through time by 4.96 
percentage points.  11
A comparison between privatized and matching firms (Panel C) shows some convergence in 
their control structures. From 1996 to 2000, the differences in the percentage of firms controlled by 
families, widely held financial institutions, and miscellaneous shareholders decline or become 
insignificant.  
[Table II goes here] 
Table II shows that, on average, in 1996 the largest ultimate controlling shareholder 
controlled 27.80 percent of voting rights of privatized firms. This percentage marginally declines to 
25.51 percent as of the end of 2000. Amongst companies in which the government is the largest 
shareholder, government control rights average 51.27 percent at the end of 1996, and 52.18 percent 
at the end of 2000. So, in these companies, the government not only is the largest shareholder, but 
on average it controls the majority of votes. Furthermore, there is little evidence of a decline in the 
role of government as a major shareholder. 
In 1996, control rights are more diffuse for the control sample, where we find that the largest 
shareholder on average controls 21.10 percent of votes. This proportion, however, increases 
substantially by the end of 2000, when the largest shareholder controls 26.37 percent of votes. As a 
consequence, we observe a convergence in the concentration of voting power between privatized 
and matching firms. This convergence, however, comes from changes in the control structure of 
matching firms, which becomes much more concentrated. For the most part, these changes are the 
consequence of merger and acquisition activity. 
 
B.     Golden shares 
The analysis of control (voting) rights does not provide a full picture of the real power 
wielded by the government shareholder, who can grant itself wide discretionary powers over 
partially or even fully privatized firms by the use of golden shares.  12
We define golden share as the system of the state’s special powers over and statutory 
constraints on privatized companies.  Typically, special powers include (i) the right to appoint 
members in corporate board; (ii) the right to consent to or to veto the acquisition of relevant 
interests in the privatized companies; (iii) other rights such as to consent to the transfer of 
subsidiaries, dissolution of the company, ordinary management, etc. The above mentioned rights 
may be temporary or not. On the other hand, statutory contraints include (i) ownership limits; (ii) 
voting caps; (iii) national control provisions. 
This set of powers and constraints may stem from the possession of a redeemable special 
share, from limitations imposed by the privatized company’s statutes, often in accordance with the 
privatization law, or from the possession of special class shares.  
Golden shares have different institutional characteristics in different countries. For example, 
in the U.K., the prior consent of the special shareholder is normally required for any change in the 
ownership limitations in the Articles of Association, which usually prevent a person - or persons 
acting in concert - from having an interest of 15 percent or more in the voting share capital. The 
articles defining rights attached to the special share cannot be altered or removed. The special 
shares do not carry any rights to vote at general meetings, but they do entitle the holder to attend 
and speak at such meetings. The special share in this “basic” form applies to National Power Plc, 
Scottish Power, AEA Technology Plc, and National Grid Group Plc. The rights attached to the 
special share are wider only in a few cases where a national “strategic” interest can be identified. 
The French action spécifique is particularly diversified. In general, prior approval of the Minister is 
required if persons or entities are to hold more than a certain percent of the capital or voting rights 
(10 percent for Elf Aquitaine (now Total-Fina Elf), Havas, and Thomson-CSF (now Thales)). 
Usually a representative of the French Government is appointed to the Board of Directors to act on 
behalf of the Minister. In some cases he has limited veto power (i.e. for Elf Aquitaine, to block the 
sale of certain strategic assets), while in others he can veto any board resolution (Thomson-CSF).   13
In Turkey, in some cases special powers are so extensive that they involve government in ordinary 
management.  
Listed companies are forced to disclose fully the presence of golden share provisions in their 
prospectuses. We have therefore solicited privatization prospectuses from individual companies, 
investment banks, security exchange commissions, and privatization agencies. We have been able 
to obtain 104 prospectuses out of our sample of 141 companies privatized in OECD countries in the 
1977-2000 period.
8 We then identified the presence of golden shares in the company’s prospectus.  
[Table III goes here] 
Table III documents the diffusion of golden shares amongst privatized firms. We find that 
62.5% of such firms have outstanding golden shares as of the end of 1996. Special powers are quite 
frequent and appear in 39.42% privatized companies. Additionally, in a number of cases privatized 
companies’ statutes set upper limits on the individual ownership voting rights that can be acquired 
without government approval. In some cases, these limitations only apply to ownership held by 
foreign investors. It is common for the privatized company’s statute to require the headquarters to 
be located in the country of incorporation or for it to require the board members to be citizens of the 
country of incorporation. 
Golden shares are more common amongst companies in which the government is not the 
largest shareholder. As reported in Table III, as of the end of 1996, golden shares were present in 
56.41 percent of the 39 companies under government control (under the 10% rule), and in 66.15 
percent of the remaining 65 firms in which the government was not the largest shareholder. A 
similar picture comes out at the end of 2000, when golden shares are present in 57.58 percent of 
companies in which the government was the largest shareholder, and in 64.79 percent of firms in 
which the government does not control at least 10 percent of votes. 
                                                 
8 Detailed institutional information about golden shares can be found from some official web sites (such as the HM 
Treasury in the United Kingdom, www.hm-treasury.gov.uk, the Spanish Sociedad Estatal de Participaciones 
Industriales, www.sepi.es, the Austrian Holding and Privatisation Agency, www.oiag.at).  14
Table III shows that, through ownership or golden shares, the government controls 65.2 
percent of privatized firms as of the end of 1996, and 62.4 percent of privatized firms as of the end 
of 2000. This evidence clearly indicates that, in the majority of cases, the “privatization” process 
was not followed by a complete relinquishment of power by the state. 
[Table IV goes here] 
Table IV shows that government reluctance to privatize is particularly common in some 
sectors, such as basic industries, in which 84.6 percent of the privatized companies have golden 
shares or the government is the largest shareholder. Other industries that are similarly dominated by 
the government after privatization are leisure (100 percent), petroleum (77.8 percent), services (100 
percent), textile and trade (100 percent), transportation (70.6 percent), and utilities (77.1 percent). 
Government ownership, special powers, and statutory constraints are quite absent in the financial 
sector, appearing “only” in 35.3 percent of the companies.  
 
IV.  Valuation and performance of privatized and matching firms             
A.  Univariate results 
Table V reports company market-to-book (MB) ratios and stock price performance.
9 The MB 
ratio is defined as the ratio of market value of ordinary and preferred equity to the book value of 
equity. Stock price performance (total investment return) is computed as {[(market price year end + 
dividends per share + special dividend quarter 1 + special dividend-quarter 2 + special dividend-
quarter 3 + special dividend-quarter 4) / last year's market price-year end] - 1} * 100. 
[Table V goes here] 
For the whole sample, we find that privatized companies are significantly less valuable than 
their peers in terms of MB ratio in every year considered (Panel A). However, the difference in the 
average (median) MB ratio declines from a maximum of -1.38 (-0.93) in 1997 to a minimum of - 15
0.61 (-0.16) in 2000. Thus, we find that the market value of privatized firms converges toward the 
valuation levels of their matching peers. On the other hand, we find that privatized firms 
(insignificantly) outperform their peers on a stock return basis in all years except 2000 (Panel D). 
Panels B and C in Table V separately report the MB ratio of privatized companies that are 
still under government control (as of the end of 1996) and those in which the government is no 
longer the largest shareholder. Interestingly, the valuation of government controlled firms is closer 
to that of their matching peers than to the valuation of non-government controlled companies.
10 For 
example, in 1996, the difference between the average (median) MB ratio of privatized firms still 
under government control and the MB ratio of their matching peers was -0.55 (-0.35); at the same 
time, the difference between the average (median) MB ratio of privatized companies that are no 
longer under government control and the MB ratio of their matching peers was -1.50 (-0.94). All 
these differences were significant at the .01 level. As of 2000, the difference between the average 
(median) MB ratio of privatized firms still under government control and the MB ratio of their 
matching peers was -0.48 (0.45), while the difference between the average (median) MB ratio of 
privatized companies that are no longer under government control and the MB ratio of their 
matching peers was -0.68 (-0.31). None of these differences are significant at the .10 level or 
greater.  
Similarly, Panels E and F report the stock price return of privatized companies that are still 
under government control (as of the end of 1996) and those in which the government is no longer 
the largest shareholder. We find that privatized firms still under government control outperform 
their matched firms in every single year, although the difference in returns is not statistically 
significant. However, also privatized firms that are no longer under government control outperform 
their peers in all years but 2000. Thus, on a stock price performance basis, we generally cannot 
                                                                                                                                                                  
9 A problem of WorldScope data is the presence of outliers. All balance-sheet variables have therefore been trimmed by 
dropping observations lower (larger) than the second bottom (top) percentile.   
10 The treatment of golden shares does not affect this conclusion.  16
conclude that government ownership hurts investors, even if some abnormal performance is found 
in year 1998 for companies that are privatized more completely. 
[Table VI goes here] 
B.  Multivariate analysis  
The results of the univariate analysis suggest that the valuation and performance of privatized 
and matching firms tend to converge over time, but that government’s willingness to relinquish 
control does not seem to explain the speed of that convergence. In particular, the presence of the 
state as the largest ultimate shareholders does not affect negatively the adjusted market value of 
state-owned enterprises (SOEs). On the contrary, privatized companies that are more tightly 
controlled by the state have an average market-to-book closer to that of their private counterparts. 
These preliminary results are quite surprising and they led us to perform a thorough empirical 
test of the role of government control in the valuation and performance of firms. To proceed in that 
direction, some additional data collection is needed. First, we have to track changes in 
governments’ direct and indirect ownership in our sample of privatized firms. These changes in 
direct stake may be due to further privatization sales, to primary (capital raising) issues, or to 
acquisitions of the company’s shares by the government or other public entities. Obviously when 
pyramiding occurs, changes in the ownership structure have to be identified along the entire control 
chain in order to obtain data on control rights that is consistent with the data analyzed in section II. 
Second, a set of economic and financial variables has to be constructed to control for firm-specific 
time varying effects. 
We investigate the average impact of changes in government control rights on the adjusted 
valuation and performance of privatized firms by estimating the following specification: 
 
   it i it it t i it SPECIAL STATE x y υ δ γ β α α + + + ∆ + + = ∆ ' ,          (1) 
  17
where  it y ∆  is the difference between the valuation or the performance indicators of the privatized 
company and its matching firm (the market-to-book, MB, and stock price return, RETURN, 
respectively),  it x ∆  is the vector of control variables, STATE is the share of control rights of the 
government in the privatized company,
11 SPECIAL is a dummy taking the value one when the 
special powers are granted to the state,
12 αi is the fixed effect, and αt is a vector of time dummies to 
capture year effects. Cross-sectional units are the pairs given by the privatized company and its 
match. Thus the fixed effect captures these pair-specific effects. 
As to control variables, we use a large set of financial variables constructed by taking 
differences between the privatized and the matching companies, using WorldScope data. A 
valuation differential can be explained by differences in the company size. By construction, 
matching firms are selected to be within in a range of +/- 30 percent of the privatized firm's market 
capitalization in the initial year. However, size can vary considerably over time due to M&A 
activity. We therefore control for this effect with the variable ∆SIZE, which is the difference 
between the (log of) the end of year market capitalizations. Leverage has also been shown to matter 
in the valuation of firms, so the debt-to-equity ratio (∆DEBT) is included. Difference in market 
performance could also be ascribed to the degree of efficiency with which the companies use their 
assets. We then construct ∆ASSETURN as the ratio of sales to total assets to measure how many 
times the matching company turns over its assets relative to the privatized firm. Other control 
variables show the effect of differences in investment, as measured by differences in the ratio of 
total capital expenditure to sales (∆CAPEX), in operating cash flow (∆EBITDA), the growth rates of 
total sales (∆GROWTH), and the effect of differences in productive efficiency as measured by total 
sales per employee (∆SALESPEREMP).  
                                                 
11 Since, by construction, the government never shows up as controlling owner of matching firms, the variable STATE 
can be interpreted as the difference between government ownership in privatized and government ownership in 
matching firms. A similar interpretation applies to SPECIAL. 
12 Golden share mechanisms are strongly correlated. We therefore decided to include in the regression analysis only the 
dummy SPECIAL, which occurs more frequently, to avoid multicollinearity problems. The choice of a different golden 
share dummy does not affect qualitatively our results.  18
The market value and financial performance of privatized firms might be affected by industry 
sector. Indeed, some former state monopolies operating in energy, transportation, 
telecommunications, and utilities, are considered strategically important for the national economy 
and are often shielded from competition. Furthermore, they may enjoy favourable treatment by the 
state in terms of subsidized loans, favorable regulatory treatment, guaranteed business, and the like. 
Thus higher valuation and performance could stem from the presence of rents and special benefits 
which are granted to privatized companies and not to their private competitors. We partially control 
for this factor by using dummy variables based on two-digit SIC codes for three sectors that are 
relatively heavily regulated and less competitive (PETROLEUM, TRANSPORT, and UTILITIES).  
Series for all these variables have been computed for the period 1996-2000. Both the choice 
of the market-to-book and stock price returns as measures of valuation and performance and the 
inclusion of most of these controls are rather standard in the literature (see, for example, Lang, Ofek 
and Stulz, 1996, McConnell and Servaes, 1990, Morck, Shleifer and Vishny, 1988).  
Equation (1) has been estimated by using random effects models, which assume that 
( )
2 , 0 ~ α σ α IID i   and  ()
2 , 0 ~ υ σ υ IID it . In order to assess the consistency of the random effects, we 
have performed a Hausman (1978) specification test, under the null of non-systematic differences in 
the coefficients of the fixed and random effects models. If they do not differ statistically, the 
random-effects model is more efficient. Clearly, the test is performed only on the coefficients of the 
time-varying variables included in both models. 
Table VI presents the results of the regression analysis. Columns (I) to (V) report the 
estimated coefficients of OLS models. We first run a basic specification with a set of control 
variables and then add our two measures for government (direct and indirect) control rights, SIZE 
and SPECIAL. Finally, we add our sector dummies as additional controls in these specifications. 
We have opted for parsimonious specifications since the number of observations shrinks rapidly 
when additional control variables are included. We report the estimated coefficients of the set of  19
control variables that yielded more interesting results. However, the point estimates of the two main 
variables are not affected by the choice of different controls. 
[Table VI goes here] 
Table VI partially confirms the preliminary evidence from the univariate analysis. The size of 
government’s residual stake does not seem to negatively affect relative valuation. On the contrary, 
when we control for the presence of special powers (regressions III and V), we find a positive and 
significant coefficient on the variable STATE. This suggests that a higher stake brings the privatized 
company’s market-to-book closer to its private match. However, special powers do not have a 
significant impact on corporate valuation.  
Our control variables yield some interesting results, too. The coefficients of the difference in 
company size and asset turnover are always positive and highly statistically significant. We report 
also some weaker evidence on the role of leverage in corporate valuation: We find a lower 
difference in the debt-to-equity ratio associated with a large difference in market performance, a 
finding consistent with several previous studies. Interestingly, the state does not appear to provide 
rents to companies operating in more regulated and less competitive sectors. In fact, our sector 
dummies are insignificantly related to relative valuation. More important, government stakes 
remain significant when these additional control variables are included. 
Table VI reports also the estimated coefficients when adjusted stock return is the dependent 
variable. We do not find evidence that higher stakes by the government negatively affect company 
performance. In all our regressions, the coefficient of the variable STATE is positive but 
insignificant. The only significant variable is again company size, for which we report a positive 
and highly statistically significant coefficient in all regressions. The presence of golden shares 
seems to have a negative effect on stock prices when we control for sector dummies. Company 
performance does not seem affected by industry sector, with the exception of utilities where 
privatized companies may enjoy some monopolistic rents.  
  20
C.  Endogeneity of government control rights 
Conceptually, the OLS estimation of Equation (1) can be affected by a simultaneity bias. The 
variable STATE, measuring government’s residual control rights in the privatized company, could 
be endogenous to market valuation and performance (Caves and Christensen, 1980, Martin and 
Parker, 1995, and Kole and Mulherin, 1997). Indeed, a government may attempt to privatize, and 
therefore to reduce its stake in the SOE, at times when the company is more valuable or yields 
abnormal returns in order to fetch a better price. If error terms are correlated with residual stakes, 
consistent estimates can be obtained through two-stage least squares (2SLS) estimation using a 
vector of exogenous instruments. 
Possible valid instruments to cope with our endogeneity problem are the partisan orientation 
of governments, political-institutional indexes, and public finance variables (Bortolotti et al., 2003; 
Bortolotti and Pinotti, 2003). Political orientation is captured by a variable (PARTISAN) that ranges 
from 0 (extreme left of the political spectrum) to 10 (extreme right), measured by the weighted 
average of scores given in expert surveys to the parties supporting government, as in Huber and 
Inglehart (1995). Weights are the number of seats obtained by each party as a percentage of total 
seats of the ruling coalition. The political-institutional index (POLINST) has been developed in 
comparative political science and it allows categorizing countries on a majoritarian-consensual 
dimension (see Lijphart 1999). POLINST is an average of a disproportionality index, the effective 
number of parties, and a measure of government stability (see Lijphart 1999). These political 
indexes are based on electoral data and display variability both in time and cross-sectionally. 
13 The 
public finance variable used is the debt-to-GDP ratio.  
[Table VII goes here] 
Table VII reports the two-stage least squares coefficients of the same models estimated by 
OLS. The results of the first stage regression are quite interesting per se and suggest that partisan 
                                                 
13 For a more accurate description of these political and institutional variables and sources see Bortolotti and Pinotti 
(2003)   21
politics and political institutions matter in explaining the government’s willingness to relinquish 
control. Governments leaning toward the right of the political spectrum are associated with lower 
residual stakes in privatized companies, and so are majority-consentual countries. These results are 
consistent with previous results showing that in OECD countries the extent of a country’s 
privatization (measured as revenues scaled by GDP) is associated with right-wing governments and 
with majoritarian political systems (Bortolotti and Pinotti, 2003). Public finance appears to be 
particularly important in the first-stage regressions using adjusted returns, where we find the debt-
ratio significantly related to lower residual stakes. Overall, the high joint statistical significance of 
the first-stage regression indicates that these variables may be valid instruments for government 
control rights. We confirmed the validity of our instruments by running a Sargan (1958) test of 
over-identifying restrictions.  
When we control for endogeneity, the previous result showing an association between  the 
role of government control rights and performance is strengthened The coefficient of the fitted 
value of variable STATE is always positive and statistically significant at the .05 level. The 
absolute value of the coefficient suggests that the effect of a decrease of government control rights 
may be economically relevant. For example, a reduction in government ownership of 10 percent is 
associated with a decrease of approximately 0.6 (-10 X 0.06) in adjusted market-to-book. Quite 
strikingly, our data seem to suggest that larger government stakes do not reduce the market 
valuation of state-owned enterprises. Rather, fully divested companies appear to be on average less 
valuable. This result is robust to the inclusion of special powers of the state as an additional 
regressor (which is again insignificant), and to changes in the choice of instrumental variables. The 
coefficients on the other control variables at the firm level confirm the previous results, with size 
and asset turnover explaining a large fraction of the variance in valuation differentials. The effect of 
government ownership survives when our sector dummies are included, suggesting that higher 
market-to-book ratios are not driven by lack of competition or weak regulation.  22
Table VII presents the same regressions with adjusted stock returns as dependent variable. 
Results allow us to conclude that larger holdings by the state do not appear to affect negatively 
either valuation or performance. The coefficient of the fitted value of STATE is not significant. 
Rather, it is positive and significant when we add the sector dummies (Equation VIII). Overall, the 
only factors that seem to matter are again company size and the utility sector.  
 
V.  Conclusions 
We document two new important findings concerning the control and value of privatized 
firms. First, we show that, across our sample of OECD countries, the privatization process has been 
carried out reluctantly. By employing the relatively new concept of ultimate control to follow 
changes in the ownership of privatized companies, we show that, as of the end of 2000, 
governments are either the largest shareholders or have substantial veto powers in almost two thirds 
of formerly state-owned firms.  
Second, although we document a convergence in privatized company valuations (MB ratios) 
through time toward those of the matched sample, we find that this convergence in market values 
does not depend on the government relinquishing control rights. Rather, a higher percentage of 
control rights held by the government results in privatized companies having higher (peer) adjusted 
market-to-book ratios. This result is robust to changes in control variables, and is not affected by 
reverse causality. We also find no evidence of stock price underperformance by privatized firms 
that are more tightly controlled by the state. The reported evidence casts doubt on the empirical 
validity of the “political view” when applied to (partially) privatized companies.   23
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Table I. Ultimate Control of Privatized and Matching Firms (Largest Shareholder) 
Data for 141 privatized corporations and 141 matching firms are used to construct this table. The table presents the 
percentage of firms controlled by different controlling owners, using 10% ownership as the threshold.  Controlling 
shareholders are classified into six types. State: A national government (domestic or foreign), a local authority (county, 
municipality, etc.), or a government agency. Family: A family (including an individual) or a firm that is unlisted on any 
stock exchange. Widely held financial institution: A financial firm (SIC 6000-6999) that is defined as widely held 
because no shareholder controls 10% or more of the votes; held at the control threshold. Widely held corporation: A 
nonfinancial firm, widely held using the control threshold. Cross-holdings: The firm Y is controlled by another firm, 
that is controlled by Y, or directly controls at least 10 percent of its own stocks. Miscellaneous: Charities, voting trusts, 
employees, cooperatives, or minority foreign investors. Companies that do not have a shareholder controlling at least 10 
percent of votes are classified as widely held. 
a, 
b, and 
c denote statistical significance at the .01, .05, and .10 levels, 
respectively.   
Panel A: Privatized Firms 
— of which:  Time period  Number 
of firms 















End of 1996  141  34.75  16.31 2.84 13.48  2.84  17.02  1.42 0.00 27.66 
End of 2000  141  29.79  19.86 2.84 17.02  4.26 9.93 4.96 0.71 30.50 
Diff  ’00-‘96    -4.96 
b  3.55 0.00 3.55  1.42  -7.09 
b 3.55 
b 0.71  2.84 
T-stat    -2.14  1.04  0.00  1.09  0.82 -2.27 2.27 1.00 0.78 
Panel B: Matching Firms 
— of which:  Time period  Number 
of firms 















End of 1996  141  0.00  35.46 13.48 21.99 2.13 19.86 4.96 0.00 37.59 
End of 2000  141  0.00 28.37 7.09 21.28  8.51  11.35  8.51 1.42 41.84 
Diff  ’00-‘96    0.00 -7.09 
c -6.38 
a -0.71 6.38 
b -8.51 
b 3.55  1.42  4.26 
T-stat    . -1.78 -2.78 -0.19 2.36 -2.49 1.51  1.42 0.97 
Panel C: Difference between Privatized and Matching Firms 



















b 0.71  -2.84 -3.55 
c 0.00  -9.93 
c 
T-stat   8.63 -4.26 -3.81 -2.15 0.38 -0.60 -1.91 .  -1.82 
Diff end 2000    29.79 
a -8.51 
c -4.26 
c -4.26 -4.26 -1.42 -3.55 -0.71  -11.35 
b 
T-stat   7.71 - 1.74 -1.92 -0.90  -1.61 -0.39 -1.21 -0.58  -2.30  31
Table II. Ultimate Control Rights   
Data relating to 141 privatized corporations and 141 matching firms are used to construct this table. Control rights is the 
percentage of voting rights ultimately controlled by the largest controlling shareholder. Government control rights is the 
percentage of voting rights controlled by the Government as the largest shareholder. Private control rights is the 
percentage of voting rights controlled by the largest shareholder in firms matching those in which the Government is the 
largest controlling shareholder.  
a, 
b, and 
c denote statistical significance at the .01, .05, and .10 levels, respectively.   
Panel A: Privatized Firms 
Country Number  of 
firms 
Mean Median  1
st quartile  3
rd quartile  Government 
Control Rights 
End of 1996  141 27.80  19.99  0.00  51.00  51.27  (N=49) 
End of 2000  141 25.51  16.16  6.02  42.15  52.18  (N=42) 
           
Diff  ’00-‘96   -2.29        
T-stat   -1.26        
Panel B: Matching Firms 
Country Number  of 
firms 
Mean Median  1
st quartile  3
rd quartile  Private Control 
Rights 
End of 1996  141 21.10  11.92  0.00  31.60  15.67  (N=49) 
End of 2000  141 26.37  13.40  5.90  33.35  17.76  (N=42) 
           
Diff  ’00-‘96   5.27 
b        
T-stat   2.13        
Panel C: Difference between Privatized and Matching Firms 
Country All  Firms  (Mean) 
 
 Government-  Controlled  Firms 
Diff end 1996  6.70
 b    35.50
 a 
T-stat  2.37    9.10 





















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table IV. Industry Distribution of Privatized Firms by Control Type 
Gov’t Controlled firms are those whose largest shareholder (at the 10 percent threshold) is a national government 
(domestic or foreign), a local authority (county, municipality, etc.), or a government agency. Golden share is a dummy 
that takes the value of 1 if the Government enjoys special powers or if there are statutory constraints on privatized 
companies.  Industry Classification is based on Campbell (1996. p. 316). 
Industry  
Classification 




(as of end ’96) 
Non-Gov’t 
Controlled  
& No Golden 
Share 
(as of end ’96) 
Obs. in the 
Industry as % 
of all 
Privatizations 
Gov’t Controlled or  
Golden Share as % of 
Privatizations in the 
Industry 
Basic Industries  10, 12, 14, 24, 26, 28, 33  11 2  9.2 84.6 
Capital Goods   34, 35, 38  2 2  2.8  50.0 
Consumer durables  25, 30, 36, 37, 50, 55, 57  10 5  10.6  66.7 
Construction  15-17, 32, 52  2 1  2.1  66.7 
Finance/real estate  60-69  12 22  24.1 35.3 
Food/Tobacco  1, 9, 20, 21, 54  3 2  3.5  60.0 
Leisure  27, 58, 70, 78, 79  3 0  2.1  100.0 
Petroleum 13,  29  7 2  6.4  77.8 
Services  72, 73, 75, 80, 82, 87, 89  2 0  1.4  100.0 
Textiles/Trade  22, 23, 31, 51, 53, 56, 59  1 0  0.7  100.0 
Transportation  40-42, 44, 45, 47  12 5  12.1  70.6 
Utilities  46, 48, 49  27 8  24.8  77.1 
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Table V. Value and Performance of Privatized and Matching Firms 
Data relating to 141 privatized corporations and 141 matching firms are used to construct this table. The table presents, 
in Panels A through C the mean and (below) the median of Market-to-Book. Panels D through F present the mean and 




statistical significance at the .01, .05, and .10 levels, respectively.   
Year 1996  1997  1998  1999  2000 
Panel A: Whole Sample (Market-to-Book) 
Privatized firms (A)  1.72  1.92  2.39  2.62  2.21 
  1.49 1.68  2.00  1.98  2.07 
Matching firms (B)  2.96  3.31  3.51  3.91  2.82 
  2.37 2.61  2.50  2.45  2.23 
No. matched pairs  104  106  93  82  67 
















 a -0.16 
c 
Wilcoxon Z-stat  5.88   5.40   3.39   2.58   1.78  
Panel B: Gov’t Controlled (as of end ‘96) vs. their Peers (Market-to-Book) 
Gov’t Controlled (C)  1.73  1.97  2.16  2.39  2.00 
  1.59 1.80  1.91  1.60  2.17 
Matching firms (D)  2.28  2.49  2.80  2.98  2.48 
  1.94 2.10  2.22  1.96  1.72 
No. matched pairs  33  35  33  27  24 
Difference Means (C) – (D)  -0.55
 a -0.52
 c -0.63  -0.59  -0.48 
T-stat  -2.86 -1.99  -1.56  -0.90  -1.19 
Difference Medians (C) – (D)  -0.35 
a -0.30  -0.31  -0.36  0.45 
Wilcoxon Z-stat  2.28   1.20  1.55  0.86  1.03 
Panel C: Non-Gov’t Controlled (as of end ‘96) vs. their Peers (Market-to-Book) 
Non-Gov’t Controlled (E)  1.72  1.90  2.52  2.73  2.32 
  1.43 1.66  2.00  2.10  2.00 
Matching firms (F)  3.22  3.71  3.91  4.36  3.00 
  2.37 2.92  2.64  3.05  2.31 
No. matched pairs  71  71  60  55  44 




 a -0.68 
T-stat  -4.95 -4.64  -2.76  -2.86  -1.36 
Difference Medians  (E) – (F)  -0.94




Wilcoxon Z-stat  5.31   5.37   2.95   2.55   1.33 
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Table V. Value and Performance of Privatized and Matching Firms (Cont’d) 
 
Year 1996  1997  1998  1999  2000 
Panel D: Whole Sample (Total Investment Return) 
Privatized firms (A)  26.73  32.95  24.57  24.23  -0.33 
  25.63 26.89  21.12  11.81  -1.86 
Matching firms (B)  24.32  29.50  12.31  19.47  2.96 
  22.47 24.73  7.43  12.15  2.21 
No. matched pairs  96  96  96  84  67 
Difference Means (A) – (B)  2.41 3.45 12.26 
a 4.75  -3.28 
T-stat  0.68 0.70  2.63  0.72  -0.68 
Difference Medians  (A) – (B)  3.16  2.17  13.70 
a -0.34  -4.07 
Wilcoxon Z-stat  0.72 0.91  2.85  1.00  0.63 
Panel E: Gov’t Controlled (as of end ‘96) vs. their Peers (Total Investment Return) 
Gov’t Controlled (C)    23.36  30.26  18.77  17.76  1.08 
  23.53 22.56  18.74  7.58  -4.62 
Matching firms (D)  21.35  29.02  9.53  15.53  0.18 
  22.65 30.93  8.93  11.85  1.56 
No. matched pairs  30  32  32  27  21 
Difference Means (C) – (D)  2.01 1.24  9.23  2.24  0.90 
T-stat  0.32 0.16  1.28  0.22  0.09 
Difference Medians (C) – (D)  0.88  -8.37  9.81  -4.27  -6.18 
Wilcoxon Z-stat  0.11 0.06  1.10  0.14  0.12 
Panel F: Non-Gov’t Controlled (as of end ‘96) vs. their Peers (Total Investment Return) 
Non-Gov’t Controlled (E)  28.26  34.29  27.48  27.29  -0.97 
  26.83 28.92  22.99  15.94  -1.00 
Matching firms (F)  25.68  29.74  13.71  21.35  4.22 
  22.28 20.94  6.23  12.84  3.07 
No. matched pairs  66  64  64  57  46 
Difference Means (E) – (F)  2.59 4.55 13.77 
b 5.94  -5.19 
T-stat  0.60 0.72  2.29  0.70  -0.95 
Difference Medians (E) – (F)  4.56  7.99  16.76 
a 3.10  -4.06 
Wilcoxon Z-stat  1.01 1.24  2.59  1.17  0.64 
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Table VI. Estimating the (Adjusted) Value and Performance of Privatized Companies 
This table reports the estimated coefficients and associated t-statistics (in parentheses) of random effects panel data 
estimation under the assumption that intercepts are drawn from a normal distribution. All the variables are constructed 
as differences between the values of the privatized and matching firm in year t. The dependent variable in regressions 
(I) through (V) is the market-to-book (∆MB). In Models (VI) through (X), the dependent variable is the Total 
Investment Return. ∆DEBT is the ratio debt-to-ratio equity. ∆CAPEX is total capital expenditure to sales. 
∆ASSETURN is asset turnover, measured  by the ratio of sales to total assets. ∆SIZE is the (log of) end of year market 
capitalization. STATE is the government’s voting rights in the privatized firm. SPECIAL is a dummy that takes the 
value of 1 if the Government enjoys special powers in privatized companies. Special powers stem from the possession 
of special class shares and from provisions contained in the privatized company’s statute, which include (i) the right to 
appoint members to corporate boards; (ii) the right to consent to or to veto the acquisition of relevant interests in the 
privatized company; (iii) other rights such as to consent to the transfer of subsidiaries, dissolution of the company, or 
even ordinary management decisions. PETROLEUM, TRANSPORT, UTILITIES are sector dummies referring to two-
digits SIC codes (see Table IV). YEAR DUMMIES is a set of time dummies for 1996-2000 (coefficients are not 
reported). The Hausman χ
2 tests the null of non-systematic differences in the coefficients of the fixed and random 
effects model.  
a, 
b, and 
c denote statistical significance at the .01, .05, and .10 levels,   respectively.  
Dependent variable  ∆MB
 
 (I)  (II)  (III)  (IV)  (V) 
∆DEBT -0.37  -0.38  -0.591
b  -0.381 -0.604
b 
  (-1.27) (-1.32) (-2.25) (-1.29) (-2.30) 
∆CAPEX -0.01  -0.01
c -0.003  -0.014
c  -0.004 














  (6.11) (6.17) (6.28) (6.13) (6.32) 
STATE   1.90  3.04
b  2.075 3.100
b 
    (1.36) (2.18) (1.47) (2.21) 
SPECIAL     0.726    -0.207 
     (0.76)    (-0.19) 
PETROLEUM       0.327  0.703 
       (0.23)  (0.45) 
TRANSPORTATION       -1.145  -2.314
c 
       (-0.91)  (-1.61) 
UTILITIES       0.548  1.032 
       (0.57)  (0.87) 
YEAR DUMMIES  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Nobs  355 355 275 355 275 
R-sq: within  0.18  0.18  0.28  0.18  0.28 
Wald χ
2  65.01 66.86 92.54 68.34 97.50 
Prob. 0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 
Hausman χ
2  6.53 8.75 3.96  11.74  2.63  37
Table VI. Estimating the (Adjusted) Value and Performance of Privatized Companies (Cont’d) 
Dependent variable  ∆RETURN
 
 (VI)  (VII)  (VIII)  (IX)  (X) 
∆DEBT 3.279  3.074  3.651  3.166  3.486 
  (1.49) (1.39) (1.57) (1.42) (1.49) 
∆CAPEX  -0.059 -0.057 -0.044 -0.062 -0.063 
  (-0.69) (-0.67) (-0.46) (-0.72) (-0.63) 
∆ASSETURN  -5.787 -6.273 -9.040 -5.737 -8.575 







  (7.82) (7.86) (7.31) (7.62) (7.06) 
STATE   8.953  11.506  8.179  8.492 
    (0.88) (0.99) (0.79) (0.72) 
SPECIAL     -8.120    -13.944
b 
     (-1.46)  (-2.11) 
PETROLEUM       1.361  10.541 
       (0.17)  (1.15) 
TRANSPORTATION       6.032 5.021 
      (0.87)  (0.63) 
UTILITIES       5.328  12.647
c 
       (0.97)  (1.81) 
YEAR DUMMIES  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Nobs  341 341 268 341 268 
R-sq: within  0.19  0.19  0.21  0.19  0.21 
Wald χ
2  81.66 82.38 75.97 83.27 79.58 
Prob. 0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 
Hausman χ
2  20.31 19.76 11.39 21.03 11.78  38
Table VII. Endogeneity of Government Control Rights 
This table reports the estimated coefficients and associated t-statistics (in parentheses) of a 2SLS (two-stage least squares) random 
effects panel data estimation under the assumption that intercepts are drawn from a normal distribution. All the variables are 
constructed as differences between the values of the privatized and the matching firm in year t. The dependent variable in models (I) 
through (IV) is the market-to-book (∆MB). In Models (V) through (VIII), the dependent variable is the Total Investment Return. 
∆DEBT is the debt-to-equity ratio. ∆CAPEX is total capital expenditure to sales. ∆ASSETURN is asset turnover measured by the 
ratio of sale to total assets. ∆SIZE is the (log of) end of year market capitalization. STATE is the government’s voting rights in the 
privatized firm. SPECIAL is a dummy that takes the value of 1 if the Government enjoys special powers in privatized companies. 
Special powers stem from the possession of special class shares and from provisions contained in the privatized company’s statute 
and include (i) the right to appoint members in corporate board; (ii) the right to consent to or to veto the acquisition of relevant 
interests in the privatized company; (iii) other rights such as to consent to the transfer of subsidiaries, dissolution of the company, or 
even ordinary management decisions. PETROLEUM, TRANSPORT, UTILITIES are sector dummies referring to two-digits 
SIC codes (see Table IV). YEAR DUMMIES is a set of time dummies for 1996-2000 (coefficients are not reported). The Hausman 
χ
2 tests the null of non-systematic differences in the coefficients of the fixed and random effects model. In second stage estimations, 
STATE is replaced by the fitted value from first-stage regressions, where the deficit to GDP ratio, the debt-to-GDP ratio, the right-
left orientation of the incumbent government (PARTISAN), the presence of a majoritarian-consensual pattern of democracy in the 
country (POLINST) are used as instrumental variables. 
a, 
b, and 
c denote statistical significance at the .01, .05, and .10 levels,  
respectively.  



















∆DEBT  -0.033 -0.079 0.002 0.795 -0.036 -0.083 0.001 -0.868 
  (-1.11) (-0.11) (0.08) (-1.04) (-1.20) (-0.12) (0.05) (-1.15) 
∆CAPEX -0.0001  -0.01
c  -0.00006 -0.003  -0.0001 -0.014
c  -0.00004 -0.004 
  (-0.43) (-1.71) (-0.17) (-0.43) (-0.42) (-1.80) (-0.10) (-0.51) 
∆ASSETURN -0.029  1.59
a  -0.016 3.12
a  -0.037
c  1.397
a  -0.018 3.089
a 
  (-1.35) (3.10) (-0.53) (4.78) (-1.68) (2.62) (-0.60) (4.73) 
∆SIZE 0.029  3.61
a  0.049
c  3.59








b   6.199
b  6.227
b 
   (1.95)  (2.16)  (2.07)  (2.00) 
SPECIAL     0.067  0.320     0.054  -0.766 
     (1.58)  (0.33)     (1.11)  (-0.70) 
POLINST -0.105
a   -0.111
a   -0.107
a   -0.117
a   
  (-7.13)  (-5.75)  (-7.13)  (-6.03)  
PARTISAN -0.016
b   -0.019
b   0.017
b   -0.020
a   
  (-2.20)  (-2.29)  (-2.34)  (-2.39)  
DEBT/  GDP  -0.095  -0.092  -0.100  -0.108  
  (-1.39)  (-1.10)  (-1.45)  (-1.29)  
PETROLEUM       -0.001  0.671  0.031  0.826 
       (-0.03)  (0.55)  (0.46)  (0.58) 
TRANSPORTATION       0.134
a  -1.606 0.162
a  -2.494
b 
       (2.74)  (-1.37)  (2.57)  (-1.82) 
UTILITIES       0.024  0.850  0.055  0.866 
       (0.65)  (1.00)  (1.03)  (0.76) 
YEAR  DUMMIES Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Nobs  298 298 228 228 298 298 228 228 
Wald χ
2  84 76.07 78  85  94 78.66 87 90.58 
Prob.  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Sargan  overid   1.431  0.342  1.431  0.342 
Prob.   0.48  0.84  0.48  0.84 
Hausman χ
2    9.95   -20.5.  19.07  28.95 
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Table VII. Endogeneity of Government’s Control Rights (Cont’d) 



















∆DEBT  -0.244 0.925 -0.010 3.453 -0.023 1.440 -0.010 3.558 
  (-1.50) (0.25) (-0.63) (0.90) (-1.46) (0.39) (-0.64) (0.93) 
∆CAPEX  0.0004 -0.067 0.0006 -0.028 0.0003 -0.078 0.0005 -0.045 
  (1.03) (-0.74) (1.41) (-0.26) (0.64) (-0.83) (1.17) (-0.41) 
∆ASSETURN  -0.030 -6.831 -0.007 -9.533 -0.049
b  -7.441 -0.007 -9.612 










  (1.94) (6.33) (2.05) (5.94) (2.15) (6.20) (2.30) (5.92) 
STATE 
  36.991  33.250  41.604
c   32.122 
   (1.54)  (1.37)  (1.77)  (1.40) 
SPECIAL     -0.071
a  -3.954    -0.070
b  -11.488 
     (-2.45)  (-0.57)     (-2.13)  (-1.40) 
POLINST -0.109
a   -0.128
a   -0.117
a   -0.145
a   
  (-8.20)  (-7.94)  (-8.64)  (-9.12)  
PARTISAN -0.039
a   -0.053
a   -0.048
a   -0.061
a   
  (-3.22)  (-3.90)  (-4.01)           (-4.67)  
DEBT/ GDP  -0.174
a  -0.230
a   -0.221
a   -0.322
a   
  (-2.47)  (-2.80)  (-3.06)  (-3.99)  
PETROLEUM       0.021  4.239  0.082
c  12.529 
       (0.54)  (0.49)  (1.78)  (1.20) 
TRANSPORTATION        0.184
a  4.421 0.221
a  1.659 
       (4.87)  (0.50)  (5.33)  (0.16) 
UTILITIES       0.057
b  9.213 0.098
a  13.734
c 
       (1.95)  (1.44)  (2.76)  (1.61) 
YEAR  DUMMIES Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Nobs  282 282 218 218 282 282 218 218 
Wald χ
2  106 60.18 129 54.52 139 63.31 178 58.97 
Prob.  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Sargan  overid   2.929  4.460  2.929  4.460 
Prob.   0.23  0.10  0.23  0.10 
Hausman χ
2    11.77   7.75   14.23   7.92 
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